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THE UNDERPRICING OF A-REIT IPOs  







This study analyses 45 Australian Real Estate Investment Trust (A-REIT) initial public 
offerings (IPOs) in Australia from January 2002 to June 2008, since the introduction 
of the single responsible entity to oversee the activities of listed property trusts (LPTs) 
rather than the trustee and manager roles. The study finds that this sample of A-REIT 
IPOs had a significant 3.37% underpricing and that the direct costs of capital raising 
help explain this indirect cost of underpricing. There is some evidence to suggest that 
A-REIT IPOs that seek to raise more equity capital have less underpricing, while 
those that are subscribed to more quickly have higher underpricing. The findings offer 
insights for issuers who seek to maximize the value of the A-REIT at the time of the 
IPO, underwriters who guarantee the success of the capital raising and for investors 
who are looking to invest in Australian A-REIT IPOs. 
 




The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) has been discussed in the literature 
for around forty years. Underpricing is the term used when the issue price of the 
shares of a company raising public equity capital and seeking to list on a stock 
exchange is below the closing price of the shares on the first day of listing. As such, 
underpricing theoretically allows subscribing investors the opportunity of making 
substantial first day listing returns. The international evidence as summarised in 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) and updated in Ritter (2003) has documented 
that subscribing investors made handsome double-digit (for example US IPOs - 
15.7%, UK IPOs - 12%, Swiss IPOs - 35.8%, Italian IPOs -27.1%) or even triple-digit 
(for example Chinese IPOs - 948.6%) statistically significant positive first day returns, 
on average. These studies are however of industrial company IPOs.  
 
Subscribing investors to Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) IPOs have on average, 
not earned anywhere near the industrials IPOs in terms of first day returns. Wang, 
Chan and Gau (1992) report on 87 US REIT IPOs for the 1971 to 1988 period and 
discover a statistically significant 2.82% overpricing, which means investors on 
average lost 2.82% of their subscriptions on the first day of listing.  Later work by 
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Ling and Ryngaert (1997) on 85 US REIT IPOs during 1991 to 1994 identified a 
3.60% average first day return to subscribers. In Australia, Dimovski and Brooks 
(2006a) report an average 1.2% underpricing return (but it is not a statistically 
significantly different to zero return) on 37 listed property trust (LPT) IPOs during 
1994 to 1999.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the underpricing returns of Australian  
A-REIT IPOs from January 2002 to June 2008 and extend the work in Dimovski and 
Brooks (2006b) which investigated only a small sample of 20 LPT IPOs from 2002 to 
2004 and speculated that the post 2000 LPT IPOs may have more valuation 
uncertainty than those before 2000. Prior to June 30, 2000, Australian LPTs engaged 
both a Manager (to manage the activities of the trust) and a Trustee (to grant approval 
for property acquisitions and disposals). The Managed Investments Act 1998 removed 
the separate roles of Manager and Trustee and allowed only for a Single Responsible 
Entity role. This removal of the trustee safeguard was an important institutional event 
that permits further examination of Australian LPT IPO first day returns. It is also 
worth noting that recently the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) formally re-labelled 
these listed property trusts from LPTs to A-REITs to reflect Australian REITs as 
compared to other international REITs such as J-REITs for Japanese REITs or S-
REITs for Singaporean REITs reflecting the country in which the listed real estate 
entity is listed.  
 
A total of 45 A-REIT IPOs raised over $6.86 billion of public equity capital from 
January 2002 to June 2008. This compares to around $7.15 billion raised during 1994 
to 1999 by 37 A-REIT IPOs. Dimovski and Brooks (2006a) point out that this amount 
is about three times the equity capital raised by the mining and resources IPOs and 
about one third of that raised by all industrials IPOs over the same period. Clearly,  
A-REIT IPOs are an important part of the Australian capital market and worthy of 
investigation. It is also noteworthy that no A-REIT IPOs listed during 2000 and 2001. 
The mean underpricing return for the 2002 to 2008 A-REIT IPOs was 3.37% and 
statistically significantly different to zero while the median return was 2.7%.  
 
The importance of A-REITs to institutional investors is well documented in Newell 
and Peng (2008), while Newell (2007) reported on the huge inflows of capital from 
the superannuation funds into listed property assets. Given the superannuation 
guarantee levy on employers such capital flows are unlikely to disappear. It is also 
worth noting that KPMG (2007) suggested Australia held around 16% of the global 
value of REITs and hence is an important market to consider. 
 
This study also follows a highly influential paper in the IPO literature by Beatty and 
Ritter (1986). They argue that the lower the uncertainty about the value of an IPO, the 
lower the underpricing needed to attract subscribers. Given the linkage between 
uncertainty and underpricing, this study seeks to identify the factors that might 
influence uncertainty and hence underpricing. The results suggest that the direct costs 
Pacific Rim Property Research Journal, Vol 16, No 1, 2010                                                                     
              
41 
of capital raising help explain the indirect cost of underpricing and that A-REIT IPOs 
that seek to raise more equity capital have less underpricing while those that are 
subscribed to more quickly have higher underpricing. 
 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we briefly summarise some of the 
underpricing literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 reports our results. 




This section is in two parts. The first part discusses the major theoretical explanations 
for underpricing and the second part summarises some relevant previous property trust 
and REIT IPO research.  
 
Theoretical explanations for underpricing 
Regrettably there isn’t one complete explanation for underpricing. Many theoretical 
explanations have been offered to explain underpricing. Most of the models suggest 
that the issuer and the underwriter deliberately and knowingly underprice, or that the 
subscribing investor expects the issue to be underpriced.   
 
The first three explanations discussed here are often referred to as the information 
asymmetry explanations. Baron (1982) argues that underwriters have superior 
information regarding market conditions and the demand for the IPO’s shares. For the 
underwriter to raise the required equity capital for the IPO firm, the firm allows the 
underwriter to determine the issue price, which allows for some underpricing. Rock 
(1986) suggests there are two categories of investors that seek shares in IPOs - 
informed and uninformed. He argues that the informed (and likely more influential) 
investors crowd out the uninformed (and likely less influential) leaving the 
uninformed buying more of the less profitable issues. In order to compensate the 
uninformed for this “winner’s curse” and to induce subscribers to future IPOs, issuers 
underprice. A third explanation is put forward by Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and by 
Welch (1989). They suggest that underpricing encourages new investors to see the 
quality of the IPO company which later allows the company to make subsequent 
equity issues at a higher price. As such, these companies recoup some of that 
underpricing.  
 
The next three explanations argue an underwriter monopsony power because they 
have most control over the price at which the IPO is offered. Tinic’s (1988) insurance 
hypothesis suggests that underpricing is like an insurance policy protecting the 
underwriters and the issuing firm from lawsuits. Chalk and Peavy (1987) suggest that 
underwriters might issue shares to preferred clients but then recoup this favour by 
charging higher fees for later services to these clients. This also allows less money to 
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be spent on marketing the issue. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) suggest that 
underwriters allow new issues to be underpriced to encourage investors to subscribe to 
the IPO and fill the new issue. Otherwise investors will simply wait until after listing 
to purchase the shares.  
 
Ruud (1993) however suggests that underpricing may not be a deliberate decision 
prior to the listing. She suggests that underwriters actually price support the issue after 
it is listed. This is unlikely in Australia because price support activities by 
underwriters are illegal under the Corporations Law of Australia.  
 
Except for Ruud’s (1993) paper, all of the explanations subscribe to the broad idea 
that uncertainty, issue price and underpricing are related. It was Beatty and Ritter’s 
(1986) paper, however, that more formally and empirically argued that reducing the 
uncertainty about an IPO’s valuation reduces the need for underpricing. Since that 
study, researchers have found that lower underpricing is associated in firms that:  
 
• have higher issue prices [Chalk and Peavy (1987)] 
• employ higher quality underwriters [Carter and Manaster (1990)] 
• employ higher quality auditors [Beatty (1989)] 
• have existing borrowing relationships [James and Weir (1990)] 
• have high earnings potential [Koop and Li (2001)] 
 
Previous property trust and REIT IPO research 
One of the first major papers examining the underpricing of REIT IPOs was by Wang 
et al (1992). They investigated 87 US REIT IPOs over the 1971 to 1988 period and 
found a surprising 2.82% average overpricing loss to the subscribing investors. Even 
Wang et al (1992) found it difficult to understand why subscribers invested in these 
IPOs and suggest that it may have been ignorance. 
 
Ling and Ryngaert (1997) extend Wang et al’s (1992) work by investigating 85 US 
REIT IPOs from 1991 to 1994. They report a 3.60% underpricing and suggest this 
might have been due to the greater involvement of institutional investors. They use 
Rock’s (1986) argument that the institutional investors are the more informed 
investors and hence offer to buy underpriced new issues and avoid buying overpriced 
new issues. 
 
In Australia, Dimovski and Brooks (2006a) investigated 37 property trust IPOs during 
1994 to 1999 and report an average 1.2% underpricing. They find that the 
underpricing can in part be explained by prospectus forecast profit distributions (or 
dividends) and the market sentiment towards property trusts from the date of the 
prospectus to the date of listing. They argue that higher dividend forecasting trusts are 
riskier and hence higher underpricing is found in such trusts. In some follow up work 
on 20 property trust IPOs during 2002 to 2004, Dimovski and Brooks (2006b) 
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speculate that post 1999 LPT IPOs may offer higher underpricing than earlier IPOs 
given the merging of the trustee and manager roles into a single responsible entity 
role.  Fund managers can indeed take this role. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
A total of 45 Australian A-REIT IPOs listed on the Australian Stock Exchange from 
January 2002 to June 2008. The primary source of the data for this study was the 
Connect 4 Company Prospectuses database.  Appendix 1 identifies the entities from 
their prospectus information. The trusts are categorized as retail, office or other and 
gross proceeds reported. All observations are equally weighted, they are not weighted 
by size. 
 
This study extracted variables from each of the A-REIT IPO prospectuses for the 
above period. Most of these variables have been found useful in explaining the level 
of underpricing return in previous studies. The variables to be tested are defined as 
follows: 
 
• A STAPLED dummy (0 or 1) variable is recorded for those A-REITs that 
issued stapled securities. Such securities generally consist of a unit in a trust 
and a share in a company. The unit and the share are not tradable without the 
other. The trust is likely to be the holder of income producing real estate while 
the company is likely to be involved in property development activities; 
 
• The issue price (ISSUEPRI) [Chalk and Peavy (1987), Ibbotson, Sindelar and 
     Ritter (1994)]; 
 
• A PROSENTI variable that records the change in the A-REIT Index from the 
date of the prospectus to the day of the listing [Dimovski and Brooks (2006a)]; 
 
• A TIMETOLIST variable that records the number of days from the date of the 
prospectus to the day of listing [Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996)]; 
 
•  the logarithm of the total capital sought (LNPROCEEDS) [Ibbotson, Sindelar 
and Ritter (1994)];  
 
• the logarithm of the forecasted gearing ratio (LNDEBTTOASS) variable 
reflects the target gearing of the A-REIT IPO;  
 
• the underwritten (UWRITTEN) variable is a (0 or 1) dummy variable 
reflecting no underwriter (0) or an underwriter (1) was used in the IPO 
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[Dimovski and Brooks (2004) and adapted from the underwriter reputation 
variables in Carter and Manaster (1990)]; 
 
•  the direct costs of raising the equity capital as a percentage of the capital 
sought to be raised (PERCTOTCOST) variable [Ritter (1984)]; 
 
• the next full year forecast of distribution (dividend) per unit [Dimovski and 
Brooks (2006a)];  
 
An ordinary least squares regression model is performed on the data. The dependent 
variable is underpricing return (RETURN). This is the closing price of the shares (plus 
any options) on the first day of listing minus the issue price, the result of which is then 
divided by the issue price. The closing prices were obtained from the IRESS database. 
 
The regression model with underpricing return as the dependent variable is: 
 
RETURN =  β0  + β1STAPLED  +  β2ISSUEPRI  +  β3PROSENTI  + 
β4TIMETOLIST  + β5LNPROCEEDS + β6LNDEBTTOASS + β7UWRITTEN + 
β8PERCTOTCOST  +     β9DIVYLD +  ε                                                                  (1) 
 
where all the variables are as defined previously, the β’s are unknown parameters to 
be estimated and ε is assumed ~ N (0, σ²). 
 
The first variable (STAPLED) is included because it is possible that entities engaged 
in property development activities have more variability of cash flows than those 
earning pure rental streams and hence may be considered more risky and may offer 
higher underpricing returns to subscribers. The ISSUEPRI variable is included 
because it has been found significant in Chalk and Peavy (1987). They argue that 
lower issue price IPOs are more underpriced. The IPOs in this data set all identified a 
fixed issue price for the units offered in their prospectus. It is possible that the time 
between the prospectus and the date of listing may be influenced by the market 
sentiment towards A-REIT investments. As in Dimovski and Brooks (2006a), this 
study includes a PROSENTI variable to test the hypothesis that the more positive 
(negative) the sentiment of investors towards the A-REIT sector, the more (less) the 
price that is paid for new issue units upon listing and hence the more (less) the 
underpricing return.  
 
The TIMETOLIST variable is expected to have a negative coefficient as in Lee et al 
(1996) showing greater underpriced issues are subscribed to more quickly. The 
LNPROCEEDS variable has been found to be significant in previous empirical 
underpricing research and is expected to be negatively related to underpricing. The 
LNDEBTTOASS variable is used to test if leverage influences underpricing. The 
dummy UWRITTEN variable tests whether the involvement of an underwriter 
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allowed more underpricing. In Australia, IPOs do not need to be underwritten to list. 
A total of 35 of these 45 A-REIT IPOs are underwritten. The DIVYLD variable is the 
forecast of distributions/dividends for the next forthcoming full year and was found to 
be positive and significant to the level of underpricing in Dimovski and Brooks 
(2006a). The dividend forecasts are return estimates and are subject to Australian and 
Securities Investments Commission scrutiny at the time the prospectus is lodged with 
the commission. These returns forecasts need to be commensurate with the risks 
associated with the A-REIT investments, hence it is expected that the higher the 





Table 1 reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results. There were three 
observations that did not forecast dividends and were excluded from the Table 1 
results. One observation had an underpricing return over 3.5 standard deviations from 
the mean return. This outlier observation is removed from the model and modified 
regression results reported. This identification of outliers over 3.5 standard deviations 
is consistent with Dimovski and Brooks (2006a). In addition, rather than removing the 
outlier IPOs, Table 1 also reports winsorized OLS results. Winsorizing refers to the 
setting of the observations which are above the 99th percentile value to the 99th 
percentile value so as not to excluded some observations as outliers. A variety of 
standard regression diagnostics are reported. In testing for non-normal errors, a 
Jarque-Bera statistic is reported. In testing for heteroscedasticity, a White (1980) test 
is applied. In testing for omitted variables or model misspecification, a Ramsey Reset 
test is applied and reported. 
 
For the overall model in Table 1, the results of the regression analysis suggest that the 
PERCTOTCOST variable has explanatory power with regard to the amount of 
underpricing return. The coefficient is positive and between 0.67 and 0.71 suggesting 
that holding all the other variables constant, for a 1% increase in the direct costs as a 
percentage of capital raised there is about a 0.67% to 0.71% increase in underpricing 
return to subscribers. As argued in Ritter (1984), it appears the riskiness on the A-
REIT IPO assets is partially explained by the direct costs of going public.  
 
Since the dividend yield variable is not particularly useful in this first table, it is 
removed in Table 2 so as to allow all 45 A-REIT IPOs to be included in the sample. 
Again the PERTOTCOST variable is useful. So too now are the TIMETOLIST and 
LNPROCEEDS variables which both have negative coefficients. This suggests the 
quicker the issue is listed, the greater the underpricing return and this is consistent 
with Rock (1986) and Lee et al (1996) who argue that more profitable issues (more 
underpriced) are taken up more quickly by more informed investors. The negative 
coefficient on the amount of capital sought suggests the greater the amount of capital 
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sought, the lower the underpricing and is consistent with Ibbotson et al (1994). To test 
for robustness, the model is tested again when the outlier observation is removed and 
winsorized. All three variables are still useful.  
 
The findings are similar in Table 3 which removes the UWRITTEN variable (which 
has a fairly high correlation of 0.66 with LNPROCEEDS and may unnecessarily 
influence the model) and PROSENTI which doesn’t appear to influence the model 
much at all. Again the model is run for all 45 A-REIT IPOs, when the outlier is 
removed and when the outlier is winsorized. The significant variables are again 
PERTOTCOST, LNPROCEEDS and TIMETOLIST.  While many of the A-REIT 
IPOs during 2002-8 offered stapled securities to subscribers and were expected to 
have higher uncertainty about their future cash flows (because of their likely property 
development activities) and hence higher underpricing, only the Table 2 regressions 
reflect the STAPLED variable as being mildly significant to the level of underpricing. 
This variable was not significant in the Table 3 regressions. 
 
Table 1: Regression results for the underpricing of LPT IPOs in Australia: Jan 
2002 to June 2008 
    
 Outliers        
Removed        Winsorized 
         42 IPOs        41 IPOs        42 IPOs 
 Coef. Pr.  Coef. Pr.  Coef. Pr. 
C 0.201 0.362  0.283 0.119  0.241 0.203 
STAPLED -0.039 0.120  -0.032 0.111  -0.036 0.096 
ISSUEPRI -0.028 0.103  -0.024 0.082  -0.026 0.075 
PROSENTI -0.168 0.499  -0.126 0.531  -0.147 0.487 
TIMETOLIST -0.001 0.097  -0.001 0.128  -0.001 0.089 
LNPROCEEDS -0.013 0.278  -0.017 0.078  -0.015 0.141 
LNDEBTTOASS -0.117 0.302  -0.163 0.083  -0.139 0.153 
UWRITTEN 0.013 0.735  0.026 0.401  0.019 0.553 
PERCTOTCOST 0.716 0.041  0.676 0.018  0.697 0.021 
DIVYLD 0.771 0.487  0.218 0.810  0.501 0.596 
         
         
R Squared 0.331   0.392   0.378  
Adj R Squared 0.143   0.215   0.203  
Jarque Bera 19.672 0.000  1.105 0.575  1.413 0.493 
White Test 10.763 0.824  12.582 0.703  13.501 0.636 
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Table 2: Regression results for the underpricing of LPT IPOs in Australia: Jan 
2002 to June 2008 
 All   
      Outliers      
      Removed        Winsorized 
         45 IPOs        44 IPOs           45 IPOs 
 Coef. Pr.  Coef. Pr.  Coef. Pr. 
C 0.344 0.008  0.338 0.002  0.341 0.003 
STAPLED -0.043 0.074  -0.034 0.082  -0.039 0.062 
ISSUEPRI -0.030 0.076  -0.025 0.067  -0.027 0.057 
PROSENTI -0.192 0.420  -0.148 0.447  -0.171 0.405 
TIMETOLIST -0.002 0.030  -0.001 0.072  -0.001 0.033 
LNPROCEEDS -0.019 0.054  -0.020 0.013  -0.020 0.022 
LNDEBTTOASS -0.127 0.240  -0.173 0.056  -0.149 0.112 
UWRITTEN 0.033 0.318  0.038 0.157  0.035 0.213 
PERCTOTCOST 0.677 0.044  0.644 0.020  0.661 0.023 
         
R Squared 0.305   0.367   0.352  
Adj R Squared 0.151   0.222   0.206  
Jarque Bera 22.688 0.000  0.560 0.756  0.818 0.664 
White Test 9.655 0.787  10.818 0.700  11.901 0.614 
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Table 3: Regression results for the underpricing of LPT IPOs in Australia: Jan 
2002 to June 2008 - fewer variables 
 All   
Outliers 
Removed        Winsorized 
         45 IPOs       44 IPOs        45 IPOs 
 Coef. Pr.  Coef. Pr.  Coef. Pr. 
C 0.286 0.012  0.271 0.004  0.279 0.005 
STAPLED -0.035 0.125  -0.026 0.166  -0.031 0.121 
ISSUEPRI -0.026 0.107  -0.022 0.102  -0.024 0.087 
TIMETOLIST -0.002 0.018  -0.001 0.048  -0.001 0.020 
LNPROCEEDS -0.013 0.071  -0.014 0.029  -0.014 0.038 
LNDEBTTOEQ -0.069 0.467  -0.110 0.171  -0.089 0.285 
PERCTOTCOST 0.649 0.045  0.597 0.027  0.624 0.027 
         
R Squared 0.272   0.318   0.308  
Adj R Squared 0.157   0.207   0.199  
Jarque Bera 19.436 0.000  0.426 0.808  0.563 0.755 
White Test 6.548 0.834  8.808 0.640  8.290 0.657 




This study examined 45 A-REIT IPOs in Australia for the period January 2002 to June 
2008. What it found is that the mean underpricing return for these IPOs is 3.37% and 
statistically significant. The model used to investigate variables that might help 
explain the level of underpricing in this industry sector is also particularly useful. Our 
findings are consistent with prior industrial company IPO studies, suggesting that the 
direct cost of capital raising, the time the new issue takes to list and the size of the 
issue are important elements in the level of underpricing.  
 
The underpricing results for the A-REIT IPO in this 2002-8 period are quite different 
to the earlier 1994 to 1999 period. Underpricing in the earlier period was not 
statistically significantly different to zero while it was statistically significantly 
different to zero in the 2002-8 period. This suggests more uncertainty about the value 
of these post 2000 A-REIT IPOs than previously. In the earlier period, the size of the 
capital raising was not a significant explanatory variable as to the level of 
underpricing. This is consistent with a data set where larger and smaller capital 
raisings are both supported by appropriately valued property assets, whereas in the 
latter period it appears smaller trusts may have had more uncertainty about the value 
of their assets.  
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Appendix 1.   A-REIT IPOs: 2002-8 
COMPANY NAME Retail/Office/Other Proceeds $'000 
Macquarie Prologis other 281475 
Record Realty office 38500 
Acumen Capital PSF other 64700 
Westralia PT other 4416 
Westpac Office Trust office 182500 
Rabinov Diversified Property Trust other 3000 
Galileo America Trust retail 331520 
ALE Property Group other 62000 
MFS Diversified Trust other 15015 
Macquarie DDR Trust retail 547800 
Indigo Pacific Capital other 15000 
ING RE Entertainment Fund other 26150 
Village Life other 56713 
Rubicon America office 32000 
Peet & Co other 85800 
Tishman Speyer Office office 560000 
Trinity Consolidated other 78000 
Macarthur Cook other 70000 
Babcock and Brown Japan Property retail 280000 
JF US Industrial other 241445 
S8 Property trust other 29000 
Trafalgar Corporate other 113100 
Mariner American retail 50000 
Reckson New York  office 263400 
European Investors Global other 30300 
ING Real Estate Healthcare Fund other 30500 
Multiplex Acumen Prime Property Fund other 169100 
Challenger diversified other 535600 
Rubicon Japan Trust other 178600 
Galileo Japan Trust other 284000 
MacarthurCook Asian other 80000 
Challenger Kenidix Japan Trust retail 300000 
Multiplex European other 246950 
Orchard Industrial Property Fund other 205000 
Prime Retirement and Aged Care Prop Trust other 100000 
Abacus Property Group other 40700 
Valad Property Grp office 210000 
Valad Opportunity No 11 other 33000 
Charter Hall Group other 264000 
APN /UKA European Retail  retail 180100 
Compass Hotel Group other 123000 
Rubicon Europe Trust other 258700 
Cheviot Kirribilly Vineyard Property Group other 800 
Headley Gaming and Leisure Prop Fund other 126000 
MacarthturCook Industrial Prop Fund other 37000 
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